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Beyond Chicago: will activist 
antitrust arise again? 
BY ROBERT H. LANDE* 
1 
There is no need to document the revolution in antitrust that 
occurred in large part as a result of the rise of the Chicago school 
of antitrust and the Republicans' 1980 election victory. Now that 
the Democrats are back in office a natural question arises: Will 
there be a counterrevolution? What are the chances of signifi-
cantly more aggressive antitrust in the near future? 
This article will assemble a menu of relatively new ideas and 
circumstances that could perhaps lead to an antitrust renaissance. 
It will not revisit the reasons for the failures of past enforcement 
initiatives;! nor will it discuss relatively "neutral" advances in the 
* Associate Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law. 
AUTHOR'S NOTE: I am grateful to Neil Averitt, Alan Fisher, James Giffm, 
John Kirkwood, William Kovacic, and Howard Marvel for extremely use-
ful suggestions, and to Alexander Baehr and Jack Merritt for excellent 
research assistance. 
The last time the Democrats controlled the presidency their anti-
trust appointees initiated or continued such doomed initiatives as no-fault 
monopolization, shared monopoly, and conglomerate merger cases. The 
author was an attorney at the Federal Trade Commission from 1978 to 
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2 The antitrust bulletin 
field that will not necessarily lead to a greater or lesser number of 
cases.2 Instead, this article will supply a list of possibilities that 
could conceivably contribute to an antitrust resurgence. It will 
begin by discussing some ideas and conditions that largely were 
not available to previous Democratic administrations. The article 
will then present many of the reasons behind antitrust's long 
decline. It will conclude by attempting to balance these competing 
tendencies to determine whether a counterrevolution is likely. 
1984, and every case that he worked on there was unsuccessful. This is 
almost certainly not due entirely to the author's own ineptitude, and he 
hopes that the new enforcers will not repeat the Carter administration's 
mistakes. For discussions of these enforcement initiatives see Robert 
Pitofsky, Symposium: Anticipating Antitrust's Centennial: Comment: 
Antitrust in the Next 100 Years, 75 CAL. L. REv. 817, 828-29 (1987); 
Donald F. Turner, Symposium: Anticipating Antitrust's Centennial: Com-
ment: Antitrust in the Next 100 Years, 75 CAL. L. REv. 797, 807, (1987); 
Andrew F. Popper, The Antitrust System: An Impediment to the Develop-
ment of Negotiation Models, 32 AM. U. L. REv. 283, 311 (1983). 
2 Among the large number of significant advances in recent years 
that are not necessarily proenforcement or anti enforcement are: 1. The 
development of new econometric techniques for defining markets and 
measuring market power. See Jonathan B. Baker & Timothy Bresnahan, 
Empirical Methods of Identifying and Measuring Market Power, 
61 ANTITRUST L.J. 3 (1992). 2. There is today a greater appreciation 
for innovation as opposed to static efficiency. See ANTrrRUST, INNOVATION, 
AND COMPETlTlVENESS (Thomas A. Jorde & David J. Teece eds., 1992. 
3. There is now a greater understanding of the motives underlying busi-
ness behavior. Compare, for example, our current understanding of the 
procompetitive and anticompetitive effects of vertical restraints with the 
state of knowledge of the field in 1976. See, e.g., Alan A. Fisher et aI., 
Do the DOJ Vertical Restraints Guidelines Provide Guidance? 32 
ANrrrRusT BULL. 609 (1987); IMPACT EVALUATIONS OF FEDERAL TRADE 
COMMISSION'S VERTICAL REsTRAINTS CASES (Ronald N. Lafferty et aI., eds., 
Federal Trade Commission Publication 1984), reprinted in 19 JOURNAL OF 
REPRINTS FOR ANrrrRUST LAW & ECON. No.2 (1989); THOMAS OVERSTREEr, 
REsALE PRICE MAlNrENANCE: ECONOMIC THEORIES AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
(Federal Trade Commission Staff Report, 1983). 
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1. Four relatively new ideas that could help fuel 
an antitrust renaissance 
A new Democratic administration and plaintiffs' attorneys 
could search for theories that might help to revitalize antitrust. 
Although there is no end to possible candidates, four appear most 
promising. The first is the "raising someone's costs" idea. The 
second reinterprets the overall goals of antitrust and incorporates 
wealth transfer concerns (in addition to efficiency concerns). The 
third involves the effects of imperfect information on firm and 
consumer behavior. The last involves the application of strategic 
behavior theory to antitrust. 
A. The "raising someone's costs" concept 
The concept of "raising someone's costs" is an appropriate 
starting point because it is the most prominent of the relatively 
new ideas that have emerged in recent years. This article will use 
the term "raising someone's costs" rather than "raising rivals' 
costs" in order to encompass a broad cluster of related activities 
that sometimes can be anticompetitive.3 First, activity can be anti-
competitive if it raises rivals' costs in any of a number of ways, 
including an increase in rivals' absolute costs, relative costs, 
marginal costs, fixed costs, actual costs, or potential costs.4 Sec-
ond, firms can raise consumers' search costs, or sellers' selling 
costs, in a manner that can be anticompetitive.s Third, firms can 
3 There are, of course, activities that a firm can undertake to raise 
others' costs, such as innovation, that are unquestionably pro competitive. 
See Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclu-
sion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE LJ. 
209 (1986). 
4 These cost increases can affect targeted rivals or entire markets. 
For an excellent analysis of these possibilities see John E. Lopatka, 
Antitrust and Professional Rules: A Framework for Analysis, 28 SAN 
DIEGO L. REv. 301 (1991). 
S See Detroit Auto Dealers Ass'n, 111 F.T.C. 417 (1989), af!'d in 
part and remanded, 955 F.2d 457 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 461 
(1992) (Auto dealers agreed to restrict their hours of operation. This 
4 : The antitrust bulletin 
raise the costs of third parties, in related markets, in an anticom-
petitive fashion.6 
The raising someone's costs concept describes how rivals 
can be harmed even in the absence of traditional price predation.7 
It can be applied in a variety of contexts. Not only can it affect 
Sherman Act section 2 monopolization cases and give standing to 
competitors in horizontal merger cases, but it can also affect hori-
zontal restraint, vertical restraint and vertical merger analysis.8 
It is not, of course, a totally new concept. Any boycott case, for 
example, can be considered as resting on a theory of raising 
rivals' costs. It is nevertheless an idea that was substantially 
developed by Dr. Steven Salop and others during the last decade.9 
The idea certainly was used during the 1980s.10 Many Reagan and 
Bush administration antitrust enforcement officials were skeptical 
that these situations could ever be anticompetitivell unless the 
increased consumers' search costs and made consumers less likely to 
shop vigorously for the best price.). 
6 See FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986). 
(Dentists conspired to refuse to supply xrays to insurance companies. 
This had the effect of making it more difficult for the insurance compa-
nies to determine that certain procedures might have been unnecessary.). 
7 See Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 3. 
8 See id. 
9 ld. See also Thomas G. Krattenmaker et al., Monopoly Power and 
Market Power in Antitrust Law, 76 GEO. L.J. 2412 (1987) for analysis 
and additional citations. 
10 James Langenfeld and Louis Silvia found that the majority of Fed-
eral Trade Commission horizontal restraint cases during the 1980s can 
best be explained by some cost raising theory, as opposed to normal col-
lusion or predation. They introduce the term "raising own costs" as a 
label for many of these cases. See James L. Langenfeld & Louis Silvia, 
Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Restraint Cases: An Economic 
Perspective, 61 .ANrrrn.usr LJ. 653, 655 (1993). 
11 For example, the Bush administration antitrust enforcers declined 
to include the concept in the 1992 Federal Merger Guidelines. See 1992 
U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Merger 
Guidelines, reprinted in 62 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) (Special 
Supp., April 2, 1992). 
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government was involved,12 however, so aggressive enforcers 
could utilize this framework even more in the future. 
B. Wealth transfers as a goal of antitrust 
A second new idea is the belief that wealth transfers are an 
important concern of antitrust. Before the 1980s antitrust was 
generally thought to serve a variety of social, political and moral 
objectives.t3 Part of the Chicago school revolution was to replace 
this belief structure with the narrow view that efficiency is the 
only original and legitimate concern of antitrust.14 Now a third 
possibility exists.1S This new approach asserts that the antitrust 
laws primarily were enacted to give consumers the right to pur-
chase competitively priced goods. It condemns the use of market 
power artificially to raise prices and stresses that the antitrust 
laws were designed to prevent wealth transfers from consumers to 
firms with market power. Efficiency was also meant to be a con-
cern of antitrust. But the laws' main thrust was to give consumers, 
not cartels or monopolies, the fruits of competitive capitalism.16 
Although the wealth transfer view was rejected by most fed-
eral enforcement officials during the 1980s,11 many are now start-
ing to embrace it. This idea, moreover, has only been developed 
in detail with respect to certain areas of antitrust, such as in arti-
cles demonstrating that merger enforcement would be stricter 
under a wealth transfer approach than under an efficiency 
12 There is little doubt that the government can raise industry costs 
in a manner that might have a disparate impact on certain firms. 
13 See Robert H. Lande, The Rise and (Coming) Fall of Efficiency as 
the Ruler of Antitrust, 33 ANrrrRuST BULL. 429, 430-31 (1988). 
14 /d. at 432-34. 
IS See Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and 
Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 
34 HASTINGS LJ. 65 (1982). 
16 Lande, supra note 15, passim. 
17 See Lande, supra note 13, at 458-63; id. at 438-44. 
6 The antitrust bulletin 
approach.1S The concept could, however, be examined more care-
fully and implemented more aggressively in the future. Considera-
tion of the transfer effects of market power (in addition to its 
efficiency effects) could particularly affect antitrust cases involv-
ing price discrimination (including Robinson-Patman cases and 
tying cases), horizontal restraint cases that involve a tradeoff 
between market power effects and efficiency effects, vertical 
restraint cases, and merger analysis.19 
C. Effects of imperfect information 
A third enforcement-oriented possibility arises from taking 
imperfect information concerns more seriously, pursuant to East-
man Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc. 20 This decision 
is so new that we cannot yet accurately predict its long-term 
effects on the antitrust world. We must attempt to grapple with it, 
however, because information issues significantly affected the 
Court's decision in two places,21 and were an underpinning of 
many of its major holdings.22 
18 See Alan A. Fisher et al., Price Effects of Horizontal Mergers, 
77 CAL. L. REV. 777 (1988); Alan A Fisher & Robert H. Lande, Effi-
ciency Considerations in Merger Enforcement, 71 CAL. L. REv. 1580 
(1983). 
19 See generally Lande, supra note 13, at 463. 
20 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992). This article's Kodak analysis is based 
upon Robert H. Lande, Chicago Takes It on the Chin: Imperfect Informa-
tion Could Playa Crucial Role in the Post-Kodak World, 62 ANrrrRUST 
L.J. 193 (1993). 
21 "The first information failure involved customers' inability to 
predict future chances in Kodak's policy. Before 1985, potential pur-
chasers of Kodak machines allegedly understood that after purchasing 
their machines they could go to an independent service organization 
(ISO) for parts and service. Frequently these IS0s, charged significantly 
less for service than did Kodak. In 1985 or 1986 Kodak changed its pol-
icy and any customer wishing to purchase Kodak's patented spare parts 
had to purchase a Kodak service contract as well. Kodak thus instituted 
an 'aftertie' between parts and service, effectively eliminating the IS0s. 
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If Kodak is interpreted in a narrow fashion it is merely another 
important case.23 But if the decision is read very broadly, its 
emphasis and reliance upon imperfect information could have dra-
matic effects on the antitrust world, for three reasons. First, Kodak 
holds that anticompetitive concerns can arise despite the absence 
of traditional market share-based market power.24 Kodak in effect 
holds that there are now two ways to exploit consumers; through 
traditional market share-based market power, or through imperfect 
information.2S Imperfect information can substitute for traditional 
•.. Kodak's second reliance on information failures involved cus-
tomers' inability to perform relatively complex life-cycle pricing com-
parisons. When individual consumers are involved it often is obvious that 
information imperfections can prevent purchasers from making optimal 
purchasing decisions, but a noteworthy aspect of the decision is that all 
of the victimized purchasers in Kodak were businesses. The Court 
stressed that, as a factual matter, life-cycle pricing was extremely diffi-
cult to perform accurately. Customers would have to perform this calcu-
lation for all brands on the market to be able to compare costs intelli-
gently." See Lande, supra note 20, at 174-95 (footnotes omitted). 
22 "Customers could be exploited by the aftertie only in an environ-
ment of imperfect information. Due to the 'lock-in' factor (the cost that 
would be incurred if a customer with a Kodak machine decided to switch 
to a new machine) consumers could be exploited by the aftertie. If the 
information possessed by customers before 1985 had been perfect, how-
ever, they would have anticipated their machines and were locked in to 
purchasing spare parts from Kodak. The Court said that this was an un-
expected change that consumers of the machines could not reasonably 
have anticipated. Competition involving machines, before the machine's 
initial purchase, could not have protected these consumers effectively 
since Kodak's switch was expected by neither Kodak's customers nor its 
competitors. Even if a traditional structural analysis would indicate that 
competition in a market should protect consumers, Kodak holds that 
firms with small market shares can unfairly harm consumers by taking 
advantage of imperfect information." ld. at 194 (footnotes omitted). 
23 Kodak's effects will be relatively minor if its precedent value is 
limited to cases involving aftermarkets, a major change in corporate pol-
icy, significant switching costs, etc. 
24 See Lande, supra note 20, at 197; Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2087. 
2S Neil Averitt verbally pointed out to the author an analogy to busi-
ness torts, which also can cause harm even if they do not involve market 
power. 
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market share-based market power and can make a market that, 
structurally, appears competitive to behave anticompetitively.26 
Second, imperfect information can create more narrowly defined 
relevant markets because it can effectively prevent customers 
from turning to certain potential substitutes.27 Consumers might 
not know of an option's existence or, more likely, that an option is 
a cost-effective substitute. If courts define markets more narrowly 
this usually will have the effect of making it more likely that a 
firm will be found to have market power.28 Third, businesses, like 
individual consumers, can make information-based mistakes that 
can allow them to be exploited. Consumer protection law's 
assumptions about individuals' capabilities, vulnerabilities and 
needs can apply to businesses as well.29 
Many specific areas of antitrust law could be affected if 
information often is found to be significantly impaired and 
these imperfections are found to cause businesses to make deci-
sions that are exploitable through the use of practices that are 
of antitrust concern. Among the areas that could be affect-
ed are resale price maintenance,3o exclusive dealing arrange-
26 Lande, supra note 20, at 197. 
27 Even though Kodak possessed less than 25% of the photocopier 
market the Court focused upon the locked-in customers, of which Kodak 
had a 100% market share. Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2087. 
28 For a discussion and an exception see Lande, supra note 20, at 
195; 197. 
29 We often assume that certain antitrust offenses are highly improb-
able in a market where competition is present because potential victims 
could simply shift to another supplier. This shift will not occur, however, 
if potential victims are unaware of the supracompetitive pricing and the 
consequent need to take defensive measures. 
30 Professor Warren Grimes recently showed how retailers can use 
resale price maintenance to take advantage of consumers' information 
inadequacies in a way that causes consumers to be exploited. Resale price 
maintenance can be used to guarantee large retail commissions so sales-
people will have an incentive to "push" certain brands of products. 
Grimes' model hinges on imperfect information by consumers because, 
if consumers knew that the only reason why sales clerks were pushing 
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ments,31 tying that does not involve an aftertie,32 predatory pric-
ing,33 and practices that potentially violate the Robinson-Patman 
Act.34 
particular brands was so that the sales clerks would get a higher commis-
sion, the scheme would not work. Warren S. Grimes, Spit, Polish and 
Consumer Demand Quality: Vertical Price Restraints Revisited, 80 CAL. 
L. REv. 815, 834-36 (1992). 
31 Dr. Gerald Brock's analysis of the Federal Trade Commission 
industrial gases cases involved such a situation. The industrial gases mar-
ket was changing, but manufacturers realized that the change was occur-
ring before their gas distributors realized it. The manufacturers locked 
their retailers in with exclusive dealing contracts. The retailers realized 
too late that the exclusive dealing arrangements had disadvantaged them 
(in a way that harmed competition). Imperfect information (an asymme-
try of information because the gas producers knew more about the chang-
ing nature of industrial gases market than the retailers) explained the 
imposition of the tie. See Gerald Brock, Vertical Restraints in Industrial 
Gases, in IMPACT EVALUATIONS OF FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION VERTICAL 
REsTRAINT CASES 386 (Ronald N. Lafferty et al., eds., FIC publication 
1984) (hereinafter IMPACT EVALUATIONS). 
32 Professor Howard Marvel analyzed a technological tie between 
hearing aids and batteries and concluded that the purpose of the tie might 
well have been to impose price discrimination against heavy users of 
hearing aids. Consumers could theoretically have engaged in life-cycle 
pricing (they could have calculated the discounted present value of both 
the hearing aid and the batteries they were likely to buy). Because con-
sumers were unable as a practical matter to often do this correctly, how-
ever, they could be exploited through the tie. See Marvel, Vertical 
Restraints in the Hearing Aids Industry in lMPACT EVALUATIONS, supra 
note 31, at 271, 328-29. 
33 Predatory pricing becomes more plausible if we assume the exis-
tence of imperfect information-i.e., if we assume that even businesses 
can be fooled or make significant mistakes. If information is perfect, suc-
cessful predation, including the necessary recoupment of short-term 
losses, must be extremely rare. A post-Chicago school view of the world, 
based upon the belief that imperfect information is more common, would 
conclude that predation is more common. Even old fashioned "deep 
pocket" predation can occur, as well as other types, such as "reputation" 
predation and "noisy pricing" predation. For example, if pricing and 
(footnote 33 continued) 
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D. Advances in strategic behavior theory 
The fourth possibility concerns the implications of advances in 
strategic behavior theory and game theory. This is a category of 
ideas that at its broadest includes everything this article has dis-
cussed earlier, so two additional relatively specific examples will 
be enough to illustrate this area's potential.35 
other terms are as complex as the life-cycle pricing involved in Kodak, a 
firm might not realize that predatory pricing was being used against it. 
A firm might not take countermeasures because it believed that it was 
going bankrupt due to the normal workings of the marketplace. Why 
struggle if you believe that the would-be monopolist is more efficient? 
See Lande, supra note 20, at 200-01. 
34 Violations of the Robinson-Patman Act require price discrimina-
tion. Before Kodak, traditionally defined market share-based market 
power probably was a prerequisite for illegal price discrimination. Imper-
fect information, however, can also permit price discrimination to occur 
because a firm might not know how much it actually pays for its pur-
chases. Kodak holds that a business might not know how much it effec-
tively pays for a product over its life cycle, and similar pricing com-
plexities can arise after credit terms, advertising allowances, return policy, 
service terms, special promotions, and the like are considered. These 
complications also can make it especially difficult for a company to com-
pare how much it pays with the prices that its competitors pay. Moreover, 
a company is more likely to provide a discount only to some of its cus-
tomers when information imperfections make it less likely that other 
customers will discover these discounts. Thus, imperfect information 
could, in a Robinson-Patman setting, be a substitute for a traditional mar-
ket share-based market power and provide the motive and cover for ille-
gal price discrimination. See Lande, supra note 20, at 200-01. 
35 For an excellent analysis of much of the field see Dennis A. Yao 
& Susan S. DeSanti, Game Theory and the Legal Analysis of Tacit Collu-
sion, 38 ANn1'RUST BULL. 113 (1993). A recent article also wonderfully 
illustrates how game theory and strategic interaction models can be 
applied in an antitrust setting. See Joseph F. Brodley & Ching-to Albert 
Ma, Contract Penalties, Monopolizing Strategies, and Antitrust Policy, 
45 STAN. L. REv. 1161 (1993). The authors apply a model developed by 
Aghion and Boulton to show how a monopolist can use a contract penalty 
clause as a strategic mechanism that enhances its monopoly power. "The 
penalty clause binds the monopolist and its customers in a coalition that 
wields monopoly buying power against potential entrants. The penalty 
forces an entrant to pay a penalty, through lower prices, in order to solicit 
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The first concerns how rent-seeking behavior could lead to 
antitrust issues. Rent-seeking is a relatively old concept that is 
usually discussed by "conservative" scholars.36 But consider its 
application in a franchisor/franchisee context. 37 Once a franchise 
contract is signed both parties often are locked in to some degree. 
Assume, consistent with Kodak, that there is imperfect informa-
tion at the time of the signing of the franchise agreement and that 
some franchisees do not really understand what they are signing. 
As time passes rents might accrue due to the efforts of the fran-
chisee-perhaps the franchise accumulates goodwill that is 
largely attributable to the franchisee's efforts. The franchisor 
could engage in rent-seeking behavior using tying arrangements 
or other vertical restraints to acquire this goodwill.38 Absent 
imperfect information this rent extraction would not be a concern 
for no franchisee would sign a franchise arrangement that would 
enable the franchisor unfairly to extract its goodwill. But if, con-
sistent with Kodak, we posit imperfect information at the time of 
the franchise contracts' signing, this kind of scenario might 
become an antitrust concern. Could the contracts that contained 
the "unfair" tying arrangements or other vertical restraints consti-
tute antitrust violations? Other restraints also could be analyzed as 
rent-seeking devices.39 
The second example involves the use of the 5% test to help 
define markets. The 1984 U.S. Department of Justice Horizontal 
customers from the monopolist." The authors show how this deprives the 
entrant of part or all of its expected return which will, in some cases, 
deter entry. [d. at 1163. 
36 See, e.g., Richard Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Reg-
ulation, 83 J. POL. ECON. 807 (1975); RICHARD POSNER, ANrrrRUST LAw: 
.AN ECONOMIC PERSPECITVE 11-12 (1976). 
37 This example is taken from Lande, supra note 20, at 200. 
3B For example, a pizza franchise contract could require that pizza 
franchisees purchase all their supplies from the franchisor at a supra-
competitive price. This could constitute effective price discrimination 
against successful franchisees. 
39 See the discussion of exclusive dealing, supra note 31. 
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Merger Guidelines asked whether new firms would be likely to 
enter a market if prices rose by a "small but significant and non-
transitory" increase in price (such as 5%).40 This standard can be 
criticized as being too ready to accept the possibility of entry 
because the potential entrants' addition of capacity to the market 
could depress prices, and prospective entrants would be unlikely 
to enter unless they were reasonably sure that prices would stay at 
a supracompetitive level for a long enough period for the firms to 
recover sunk costs. While this ambiguity was a problem in the 
1984 Guidelines, the 1992 Merger Guidelines explicitly take these 
strategic considerations into account.41 The new formulation is 
accordingly more skeptical toward claims of easy entry. 
II. Changes in antitrust's overall environment that could 
contribute to a renaissance 
In addition to the theoretical advances discussed above, there 
have also been changes to antitrust's overall environment that 
could be conducive to a reinvigoration of the field. These new 
conditions include (A) the reemergence of the states as aggressive 
enforcers, (B) increased criminal penalties, (C) narrower antitrust 
exemptions and, (D) increasing sophistication of plaintiffs' 
counsel. 
A. The reemergence42 of the states as aggressive enforcers 
The state enforcers had their most dramatic effects on the 
antitrust world during the 1980s in the merger area, perhaps 
40 U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Merger Guidelines, 49 
Fed. Reg. 26,823 (1984), reprinted in 2 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) No. 655, 
~~ 4490-4495 at § 3.3 (June 18, 1984). 
41 See 1992 U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commis-
sion Merger Guidelines, reprinted in 62 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. 
(BNA) (Special Supp., Apri12, 1992). 
42 "Reemergence" is a more accurate description than "emergence" 
because in the early years of antitrust the states often successfully chal-
lenged large national transgressors. For an excellent analysis see James 
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because federal enforcement diminished considerably during this 
period, thus creating what many considered to be an unfortunate 
void. During the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s no state appears to have 
filed a merger case.43 Two were filed during the 1960s and another 
two during the 1970s.44 During the 1980s the states collectively or 
individually filed twenty-nine merger cases and another sixteen 
amicus briefs or interventions.4s During 1988, moreover, the states 
collectively filed more merger cases than the U.S. Department of 
Justice's Antitrust Division. 46 Many of these cases involved 
extremely large transactions.47 There is no reason to believe that 
the states will return to their former nearly dormant status in the 
merger area or in other areas,48 so the states' continued efforts will 
be a contributing factor to any coming antitrust renaissance. 
May, Antitrust Practice and Procedure in the Formative Era: The Con-
stitutional and Conceptual Reach of State Antitrust Law, 1880-1918, 135 
U. PA. L. REv. 495, 499-502 (1987). During the first 20 years of the 
Sherman Act the Department of Justice Antitrust Division was responsi-
ble for a total of $219,000 in antitrust fines. Id. at 502. During this period 
one suit by the State of Texas alone resulted in a fine of more than $1.6 
million against the Standard Oil Co. Id. 
43 See Robert H. Lande, When Should States Challenge Mergers: 
A Proposed Federal/State Balance, 35 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REv. 1047 (1990). 
44 Id. at 1055 nn.44-45. 
4S /d. at 1056 nn.46-47. 
46 Id. at 1060 n.48. 
47 See, e.g., California v. American Stores, 110 S. Ct. 1853 (1990); 
State ex reI. Van de Camp v. Texaco, Inc., 223 Cal. Rptr. 266, 713 P.2d 
1196 (Cal. 1986), aff'd, 1988-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 68,288,46 Cal. 3d 
1147, 252 Cal. Rptr. 221, 762 P.2d 385 (1988) (proposed Texaco-Getty 
merger). 
48 See Richard Blumenthal et aI., Antitrust Review of Mergers by 
State Attorneys General: The New Cops on the Beat, 67 CoNN. BJ. 1, 14 
(1993). 
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B. Increased criminal penalties 
Criminal antitrust penalties have increased in recent years. In 
the past, prison sentences were rarely significant, 49 and were not 
frequent or long enough to constitute a serious deterrent against 
antitrust violations. There were entire years in the 1960s (and 
even one in the 1970s) when no one spent any time at all in prison 
for an antitrust offense!50 Fines also were trivia1.51 Even before the 
United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines went into effect 
on November 1, 1987~ however, criminal penalties (whether 
measured in terms of jail time or fines) increased, as did the per-
centage of the Department of Justice Antitrust Division budget 
allocated to criminal enforcement.52 After the United States Sen-
tencing Commission Guidelines became effective, penalties 
49 There have, of course, been such exceptions as the electrical 
equipment conspiracy cases. See Joseph C. Gallo et al., Penalties Under 
the Sherman Act: A Study of Law and Economics (draft 1992). 
50 ld. at 43-44. 
51 ld. at 40-41. 
52 See Charles F. Rule, Deterring Antitrust Crimes Through Stiffer 
Penalties, ALI-ABA Antitrust Seminar, San Francisco, CA (May 6, 
1988). As Professor William Kovacic notes, "The Reagan and Bush 
administrations initiated unprecedented numbers of grand jury proceed-
ings, resorted more frequently to little-used investigation techniques such 
as wire-tapping and electronic surveillance, broadened cooperation with 
other law enforcement entities and government bureaus (particularly pub-
lic purchasing officials), and increasingly invoked non-antitrust statutes 
dealing with mail and wire fraud, false statements to government agen-
cies, false claims for payment by the government, and perjury to prose-
cute apparent episodes of misconduct. . • . [In addition,] over the past 
decade, Congress has raised the maximum Sherman Act fine for individ-
uals to $350,000 and for corporations to $10 million and has increased 
the maximum prison term for individuals to 3 years. Congress also estab-
lished an alternative fine scheme that enables the government to collect 
an antitrust fine equal to double the harm suffered by victims of illegal 
conduct or double the gain realized by the defendant. A separate measure 
authorized the federal government to obtain treble damages for injuries 
suffered in its capacity as a purchaser." William E. Kovacic, The Identifi-
cation and Proof of Horizontal Agreements Under the Antitrust Laws, 38 
ANrrrRUST BULL. 5,10-12 (1993) (citations omitted). 
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became even more severe,53 so criminal antitrust sanctions now 
are more of a deterrence against anticompetitive conduct. 
C. Narrower exemptions 
Antitrust now is broader because many of its exemptions are 
more narrow. In 1976 the professions were practically exempt 
from the antitrust laws. By that year few cases in the area had 
been filed,54 but this "exemption" has of course greatly eroded 
since then. 55 The state action exemption has also narrowed,56 and 
even the insurance exemption might be far narrower than many 
recently believed.57 Antitrust now reaches a greater percentage of 
our economy; another reason for optimism and revival. 
53 Gallo et ai. document an increase in penalties from 1976 through 
1992 that is in many respects more than by a factor of 10. See Gallo et 
aI., supra note 49, at 48-49 & 69-70. 
54 For an early example see Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 
773 (1975) (holding that a minimum fee schedule promulgated by a pro-
fessional association can violate § 1 of the Sherman Act). 
55 See, e.g., Joseph P. Bauer, Antitrust & Sports: Must Competition 
on the Field Displace Competition in the Marketplace, 60 TENN. L. REv. 
263 (1993); Neil P. Motenko, Health Care Developments, 64 AmrrRUST 
LJ. 639 (1991); Phillip C. Kissom et aI., Antitrust and Hospital Privi-
leges; Testing the Conventional Wisdom, 70 CAL. L. REv. 595 (1982); 
Dennis R. Bartholomew, Antitrust and the Professions: Where Do We Go 
From Here?, 29 VaL. L. REv. 115 (1983); Phillip C. Kissom, Antitrust 
Law and Professional Behavior, 62 TEX. L. REv. 1 (1983). 
56 1976 was, of course, before such crucial decisions as California 
Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 
(1980) (holding that immunity arises only if a state actively supervises 
the activity); Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 
U.S. 40 (1982) (holding that a general home rule statute does not satisfy 
the requirement that the delegation of power must be clearly articulated 
and affirmatively expressed). 
57 See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 113 S. Ct. 2891 (1993) 
(defendants' alleged activities held to constitute a boycott and therefore 
not exempt from the antitrust laws). 
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D. Increasingly sophisticated plaintiffs' lawyers 
Today plaintiff lawyers might, on the whole, be more sophisti-
cated economically than they were a generation ago. We are all, to 
a large extent, only as sophisticated as we need to be.58 Before 
decisions like Sylvania59 in 1977 and Broadcast Music Inc. 60 in 
1979, plaintiff lawyers did not usually need to utilize sophisti-
cated economic arguments. They often were not "state of the art" 
in this regard. But they have by now adjusted.61 There are many 
examples of excellent plaintiff lawyers who utilize sophisticated 
economic theories to achieve victories for their clients.62 Aggres-
sive, innovative plaintiff lawyers are the necessary bridge between 
the theoreticians and reality.63 
58 By analogy, giraffes evolved long necks to reach relatively high 
branches. They extended their necks only as much as was required to 
reach the appropriate branches. They did not evolve necks longer than 
those needed for survival. 
59 G1E Sylvania, Inc. v. Continental T.V. Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). 
60 Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 
U.S. 1 (1979). 
61 For example, in 1982, when the Herfindahl index was introduced 
to the antitrust world through its inclusion in that year's Merger Guide-
lines, the antitrust bar was at first shocked at the prospect of having to 
square market shares. It quickly adjusted. After a very short period 
antitrust lawyers and their clients discussed Herfindahls as if they had 
been using them all of their lives. 
62 See, e.g., Kodak, supra note 20, Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 
supra note 57, and Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 899 F.2d 951 
(10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1005 (1990). 
63 Another example of forward-looking thinking by a sophisticated 
antitrust lawyer was the sponsorship by Frederick Furth (and others) of a 
conference designed to produce scholarship that might be helpful to those 
who believe in vigorous antitrust enforcement. See Eleanor M. Fox & 
Robert Pitofsky, Airlie House Conference on the Antitrust Alternative: 
Introduction, 76 GEO. LJ. 237 (1987). 
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III. Factors that will make an antitrust renaissance 
less likely 
Before anyone concludes that an antitrust counterrevolution is 
imminent, however, a number of powerful factors must be con-
sidered. Each will make an antitrust resurgence less likely to 
occur. Each will tend to minimize or counteract the effects of the 
earlier lists of new ideas and changes in antitrust's overall envi-
ronment. 
First, government enforcement resources have declined signif-
icantly while the Republicans have been in office.64 For example, 
during fiscal year 1980 there were 1719 employees at the Federal 
Trade Commission.65 During fiscal year 1992 there were only 
964,66 and no significant increases seem likely.67 While the state 
antitrust enforcers have become more aggressive during this 
period, there are less than one hundred of them in total, and much 
of their time is, of necessity, consumed by relatively local price-
fixing cases. They have limited time and resources for path-break-
ing antitrust theories or cases, and are too few in number to offset 
the decreases in federal enforcement resources. 
Second, the federal judiciary is increasingly conservative. Pro-
fessor William Kovacic notes that approximately two-thirds of 
federal judges are Reagan or Bush appointees, and Professor 
64 Moreover, the federal government must of necessity spend a sub-
stantial amount of its current resources on price fixing and mergers, leav-
ing relatively few resources for other areas. 
65 See Federal Trade Commission, Fiscal Year 1994 Program Budget 
as Submitted to Congress, March 16, 1993, at 11. 
66 !d. It seems likely, however, that the enforcers are in many ways 
more efficient than they were in 1980. New technology, for example, 
such as voice mail and PCs for almost every attorney, enables the 
enforcers to have a higher ratio of lawyers to secretaries. The overall 
downward trend presented in the text therefore probably overstates the 
true diminution in the enforcers' litigation capacity. 
67 The current number of Federal Trade Commission employees is 
expected to shrink slightly. Supra note 65. 
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Kovacic persuasively demonstrates that few are aggressive or lib-
eral in their antitrust decision making.68 A surprising finding of 
Professor Kovacic's research, moreover, is that many judges 
appointed by Democrats also are quite conservative.69 There are 
few equivalents of a Learned Hand on the federal bench today 
who will readily embrace the more innovative theories discussed 
earlier in this article. 
The third factor is the rise of the rule of reason since 1977. 
This has led to additional costs and delays for plaintiffs and has 
greatly benefited defendants. Now, for example, nonprice vertical 
restraints are judged under the rule of reason.70 Consider even the 
state of tying analysis after the Kodak decision. While this was an 
important plaintiff victory, the holding was in many respects nar-
row.71 Tying cases continue to be adjudicated under a per se stan-
dard virtually identical to the rule of reason.72 All the plaintiff in 
Kodak won was the right to spend years in discovery and hun-
dreds of thousands of dollars in litigation costs to get a chance to 
prove a large number of difficult issues under, essentially, a rule 
of reason. Because rule of reason cases are more costly and time 
consuming, and victory is less likely than under the per se stan-
dard, fewer cases are being filed. 
68 For an excellent analysis see William E. Kovacic, Judicial Appoint-
ments and the Future of Antitrust Policy, 7 ANrrrRUST 8, 11 (1993) [here-
inafter Judicial Appointments]; William E. Kovacic, Reagan's Judicial 
Appointees and Antitrust in the 1990s, 60 FORDHAM L. REv. 49 (1991). 
69 Kovacic, JudicialAppointments, supra note 68, at 9. 
70 See Sylvania, supra note 59. 
71 Kodak only directly applies to cases involving tying in aftermar-
kets, where the defendant made a major change in corporate policy, 
where information in the market is significantly impaired, and where 
plaintiff is locked into using defendant's products due to high switching 
costs. Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2087-88; Lande, supra note 20, at 198 n.17. 
72 See Jefferson Parish Hospital District No.2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 
(1984). 
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A fourth factor is the rise of international competition.73 Mar-
kets have become more international in the last 15 years as 
exports and imports have increased significantly.74 This means 
that market power is less common, markets are often defined more 
broadly, and entry into many markets is more likely to be judged 
to be easy. Although many markets were international in 1977, 
this difference in degree also means there is now less need for 
antitrust in large sectors of the American economy. 
Fifth, standing has also become tougher for plaintiffs since 
1976. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc. 7S and cases 
that followed in its wake made it more difficult for plaintiffs to 
show that they suffered the types of injuries that are the concern 
of the antitrust.76 Illinois Brick v. Illinois,77 moreover, which holds 
that only direct purchasers have standing to sue for damages, 
means that indirect purchasers, including most consumers, are 
unable to successfully receive compensation for antitrust injuries. 
Together these cases effectively shielded many wrongdoers and 
their overcharges from antitrust scrutiny. 
Sixth, much of the Chicago school "new learning" is now an 
accepted, even core part of antitrust.78 We all now have greater 
73 See, e.g., Symposium on Antitrust and International Competitive-
ness in the 1990s, 58 ANTrrRUST L.J. 515 (1989). 
74 See National Economic Strategies for a Global Economy: Hear-
ings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 19, 
21 (1992) (statement of Robert Pitofsky that imports into the United 
States have increased by $450 billion since 1970). 
7S 429 U.S. 477 (1977) (holding that to recover treble damages under 
§ 4 of the Clayton Act, a plaintiff must prove an injury that is of the type 
that the antitrust laws were intended to prevent, an injury flowing from 
that which makes the defendant's acts unlawful). 
76 See, e.g., Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 
328,334 (1990); Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 
109 (1986); J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 451 U.S. 557, 
562 (1981). 
77 431 U.S. 720 (1977). 
78 For an excellent analysis see William E. Kovacic, Federal Anti-
trust Enforcement in the Reagan Administration: Two Cheers for the Dis-
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appreciation for the needs of business and the desirability of cor-
porate growth and efficiency.79 These relatively conservative 
pro defendant insights also will make a counterrevolution less 
likely. 
Finally, there are two other aspects of antitrust that were 
unduly advantageous for violators in the 1970s and remain so 
today. First, criminal penalties are still too low. While they are 
significantly higher than in 1970s,80 an incisive paper by Profes-
sor Joseph Gallo et aI., employing a standard optimal deterrence 
model and reasonable assumptions81 shows that criminal antitrust 
penalties are even now only a fraction of those needed to obtain 
optimal deterrence.82 These results show that the present combina-
tion of fines and prison sentences continue to significantly under-
deter antitrust crimes.83 Second, civil antitrust damages are too 
low, from either a deterrence or compensation prospective.84 Pro-
fessor William Landes showed in 1983 that optimal antitrust dam-
ages should consist of "net harm to others," multiplied to account 
for detection and proof problems. 8S The lack of prejudgment inter-
est alone, however, probably lowers the nominal trebling multi-
appearance of the Large Firm Defendant in N onmerger Cases, 12 REs. L. 
& EeoN. 173,178-82 (1989), and the sources cited therein. 
79 To believe today, for example, that vertical restraints are often 
used for procompetitive reasons does not identify one as a Chicagoist, 
although in 1976 it might have. 
80 See the discussion supra section U(B). 
81 Their assumptions include a 15% chance of detection and convic-
tion, a 10% price markup, and that 1 year in prison is (dis)valued at 
$1,000,000. See Gallo et aI., supra note 49, at 63-70. 
82 ld. 
83 ld. They find the current penalties to be only 5% of their optimal 
level. 
84 See Robert H. Lande, Are Antitrust "Treble" Damages Really 
Single Damages?, 54 Omo ST. L.J.115 (1993). 
as William M. Landes, Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations, 
50 U. Cm. L. REv. 652 (1983). 
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plier down to less than the twofold leve1.86 When other factors, 
including the statute of limitations, allocative inefficiency effects 
of market power, uncompensated corporate time pursuing the 
case, and costs to the judicial system are considered, awarded 
antitrust damages are probably only between .5 and 1.1 times as 
large as actual damages.87 Because awarded damages should be 
significantly larger than actual damages to compensate for detec-
tion and proof problems,88 currently awarded antitrust damages 
are, on the average, significantly low. They are probably too low 
from either an optimal deterrence or a compensation perspective.89 
The eight factors listed in this section help to explain why the 
number of antitrust cases has plummeted dramatically since the 
Democrats were last in office. In 1979, 1234 civil antitrust cases 
were filed.90 In 1992 only 502 were filed.91 
IV. Conclusions 
We cannot reasonably expect a significant antitrust counter-
revolution in the near future. Despite the apparent promise of the 
"proplaintiff' theories listed in section I, each is extremely diffi-
cult to prove and might never move from theory to commonplace 
reality.92 The tantalizing possibilities suggested by the factors in 
86 Lande, supra note 84, at 130-36. 
87 Id. at 159 (this range utilizes Landes' optimal deterrence frame-
work). 
88 Id. at 171. 
89 Id. at 161-68. 
90 Id. at 146 n.148. 
91 See L. RALPH MECHAM, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. CoURTS, PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, .ANNuAL 
REPORT OF THE DIREcrOR, table C-2A, at 182 (1992). 
92 For example, a court could reject the use of imperfect information 
to invalidate a franchise contract, suggested in note 38, supra. The court 
could reason that information is always somewhat imperfect and if these 
clauses sometimes were invalidated, there would be insufficient business 
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sections I and II must, moreover, be considered in light of the 
anti-antitrust tide outlined in section III. The net of these factors 
suggests that there might at most be a few areas where the number 
of cases will increase on the margin. Enforcers will be unlikely to 
specifically attempt to find, for example, a situation where verti-
cal restraints are used to raise rivals' costs in a manner that results 
in an unfair wealth transfer from consumers to firms with market 
power. It is much more likely that they will carefully examine 
selected transactions and areas of the economy, especially those 
with heightened national interest,93 and in this way cases will 
arise. 
Merger enforcement, for example, will not in any respect 
return to anything even close to a Von's Grocery94 standard.95 
Nevertheless, when Kevin Arquit finished serving as Director of 
the Bureau of Competition of the Federal Trade Commission in 
1992, he noted that he was successful in thirty-seven of thirty-
nine mergers that he challenged.96 When James Rill resigned as 
head of the Antitrust Division in 1992, he noted that he was suc-
cessful in forty-five out of forty-nine merger challenges.97 These 
statistics imply that if the enforcers had been willing to lower 
their "batting average" somewhat they perhaps could have been 
successful at stopping additional corporate mergers. Federal Trade 
Commission statistics for merger challenges made between 1987 
certainty regarding the validity of franchise contracts, and that this lack 
of certainty could prevent people from signing franchise contracts. 
93 Health care will continue to be important, for example, and the 
downsizing of the defense sector should also give rise to heightened 
interest by the enforcers in this area. 
94 United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966). 
9S Even if new federal enforcers desire this outcome, federal judges 
would not allow it to happen. 
96 See Arquit to Leave FTC for New York Firm, 63 Antitrust & Trade 
Reg. Rep. 507 (Nov. 22,1992) (these figures include consent orders). 
97 See [Charles] James Outlines "Good Govt Initiatives," FTC: 
Watch, No. 377, at 13 (Nov. 9, 1992) (these figures include consent 
orders). 
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and 1992 also suggest that the Commission could have been 
somewhat more aggressive.98 Out of sixty-one challenged merg-
ers, only one involved a Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) 
change of less than 300, and only three others involved an HHI 
change of between 300 and 400.99 Only one challenge was to a 
merger that resulted in an HHI level of less than 2000, and only 
seven others were to mergers that would have resulted in HHIs of 
less than 2500.100 These statistics suggest that more aggressive 
merger enforcement, challenges that often might have been 
upheld by the federal courts, could have been possible. 
Vertical restraint enforcement could also have been somewhat 
more aggressive, as could Robinson-Patman Act enforcement. 
Good cases in these areas are extremely difficult to find, however, 
and it would be surprising if the new enforcers were able to find 
more than one or two good ones in each area per year. Section 2 
of the Sherman Act could also be enforced more aggressively, but 
, an incisive article by Professor William Kovacic persuasively 
shows that, with disappointingly few exceptions, the government 
is unable to win section 2 cases. IOI 
98 The following statistics were cleared for release by the Federal 
Trade Commission's General Counsel, in aggregated form, under Com-
mission Rule S.12(c), 16 C.F.R. S.12(c). The analysis and conclusions 
presented herein are those of the author and do not purport to represent 
the views of the Commission, of any individual Commissioner, or the 
official position of a Commission Bureau. They cover the period January 
1987 through June 1992. 
99 Four others also involved an HHI change of less than SOO. 
(Bureau of Competition estimates are used.) 
100 Five others also involved a challenge to an HHI level between 
2S00 and 3000. (Bureau of Competition estimates are used). 
101 See Kovacic, supra note 78, at 184-92; see also William E. 
Kovacic, Failed Expectations: The Troubled Past and Uncertain Future 
of the Sherman Act as a Tool for Deconcentration, 74 IOWA L. REv. 110S 
(1989). The government is particularly incapable of achieving significant 
divestiture, so the enforcers would be advised to choose § 2 cases where 
injunctive relief alone would be an adequate remedy. Id., especially at 
110S-06. 
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Additional antitrust guidelines might be another promising 
project for the new antitrust enforcers. Vertical restraints guide-
lines that were perceived as being ideologically mainstream could 
certainly be usefu1.102 Predatory pricing could be another suitable 
area, as might the Robinson-Patman Act, vertical mergers, and 
tying. 
Another possible area for change involves federal-state coop-
eration. Federal-state friction was high during much of the Rea-
gan administration, but relations improved considerably during 
the Bush administration.l°3 This relationship could improve even 
more during a Democratic administration. There is no compelling 
reason why the current federal and state merger guidelines could 
not be combined into one mutually agreed upon document. If the 
state and federal enforcers continue to work together and develop 
mutual respect and trust, this achievement should be possible. 
Moreover, the federal and state enforcers might even be able to 
achieve a division of primary authority for merger enforcement.104 
Similar federal-state cooperation could result in other jointly 
issued guidelines and perhaps also in jointly filed cases. 
The thrust of this article has been to assemble and outline 
many of the significant factors that suggest that an antitrust coun-
terrevolution could materialize, but then to sketch some of the 
opposing reasons and to predict that these tendencies largely will 
offset one another. This prediction must be tempered, however, by 
its uncertainty. Few antitrust analysts, for example, could have 
correctly predicted the Supreme Court's Kodak decision, either its 
102 The Department of Justice Vertical Restraints Guidelines were 
believed by many not to have been an ideologically neutral document. 
See Fisher et al., supra note 18, at 632. 
103 See Lande, supra note 43, at 1052-60; 1066-69 & 1090-91. 
104 See id. The European Community recently negotiated just such a 
division, determining that certain mergers should be challenged only by 
the Community, others only by individual nation states, and that still 
other mergers can be challenged at either level. Id. at 1075-80. If inde-
pendent nations can work out a division of primary responsibility, our 
federal and state enforcers also should be able to do so. 
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result or its reasoning. lOS Nor is there much certainty concerning 
the priorities or predispositions of those who will head the 
antitrust enforcement agencies or will be appointed to the federal 
bench. Nevertheless, even an optimistic prediction suggests that 
the most that can be hoped for is the end of antitrust's long 
decline with modest increases in a few areas. 
lOS A comparison of two recent cases illustrates the uncertainty involved 
and the difficulty of making predictions in the area. Carnival Cruise 
Lines Inc. v. State, 111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991), written by Justice Blackmun 
(the author of the Kodak opinion), suggests a relatively small role for 
imperfect information. A clause designing the forum to be used to resolve 
disputes was upheld despite a lack of relevant information by plaintiffs at 
the time they signed the contract. By contrast, use of the expansive view 
of the effects of imperfect information contained in Kodak, issued only a 
year later, probably would have resulted in a victory for the plaintiffs in 
Carnival Cruise Lines. 
